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TERRITORIALITY AS A DRIVER OF FISHERS' SPATIAL BEHAVIOUR: A CASE STUDY OF THE 
NORTHUMBERLAND LOBSTER FISHERY 
 
Abstract 
 
The term ‘territoriality’ here refers to a method by which fishers determine who fishes in which areas of the sea. 
Territorial rules may be either informal (and sometimes even illegal) or formal and enshrined in law. In this 
paper, attention is focused on informal territoriality, which can contribute significantly to the conservation of 
target species and to the socio-economic livelihoods of fishers and their communities. There are many examples 
of informal territoriality, particularly in developing countries, and it is becoming increasingly popular as a 
feature of fisheries management in coastal areas across the world. But there has been relatively little research 
conducted on the drivers of territorial behaviour in general, and the drivers of informal territorial behaviour in 
particular (Acheson and Gardner (2005), especially in developed countries. This paper investigates informal 
territoriality in a study of lobster fishers’ territorial behaviour and its impact on fishing in Northumberland, 
northern England. The research was based on semi-structured interviews with lobster fishers (n=44) at six ports, 
and unstructured (?) interviews with five (?) key informants. The main aim of the study was to investigate the 
existence, importance and value of territoriality in this fishery, thereby contributing to the debate over whether 
TURFs (territorial use rights for fishers) are appropriate for developed countries as well as for developing 
countries. The findings showed a beneficial pattern of informal territorial behaviour based more on social norms 
than on economic calculations, gradually being replaced by a new norm of ‘first come first served’. If the 
advantages of territoriality are to continue to be enjoyed in this fishery, its informal basis may have to be 
reinforced by a formal, legal underpinning.  
 
Keywords: territoriality, lobster fisheries, fishers’ behaviour, economic defendability, community norms, 
fisheries management 
1. Introduction 
 
There is an anthropological controversy over whether territoriality is a natural characteristic of human beings 
and if so whether it is instinctive or culturally inculcated; or whether humans are not by nature territorial 
(Dyson-Hudson and Smith 1978). Secondly, there is a linked debate over whether territoriality is a bottom-up 
product of competition between fishers (“distribution fights”), or the result of a top-down conscious design 
(“planned process”) by governments (Acheson and Gardner 2004; Acheson and Gardner 2005). Thirdly, there is 
another linked issue over whether territoriality is based on economic drivers or social norms (Pollnac 1984; 
Acheson 2003).   
 
Territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) have been in existence for many centuries (Christy 1982). Indeed, 
Ruddle and Akimichi (1989) note that sea tenure has featured in some Japanese coastal waters for at least 2,000 
years. TURFs are found more frequently in developing countries than in developed countries, where rights-
based systems of fisheries management are more likely to be founded on ITQs (individual transferable quotas) 
than on TURFs (Sakai et al 2010). As a result, there has been much more research into ITQs than into TURFs, 
and the potential value of territoriality to fisheries governance in developed countries has been underestimated 
(Cancino et al 2007). One exception to this tendency is the highly successful informal territorial system at the 
heart of the Maine lobster fishery, which has been exhaustively researched by James Acheson and colleagues. 
According to Acheson (2003), Maine is the most successful lobster fishery in the world, because the informal 
system of territoriality among fishers there has led to the implementation of voluntary local conservation 
measures such as trap limits and closed seasons (Acheson 1998) It “has promoted a sense of stewardship and 
conservation among its protagonists” (Acheson and Gardner 2005: 335)); it has produced a greater number of 
lobsters per trap; larger lobsters; and higher profits (Acheson 1990); it has contributed to the development of a 
co-management law in which fishers share responsibility for management of the fishery (Acheson & Taylor 
2001); and it is relatively peaceful (“The low level of violence and conflict in the informal system is striking. 
The rules of this system seem well-known, and most people are reluctant to violate them and deliberately cause 
trouble” (Acheson and Gardner 2005: 315)).  
 
Another informal territorial system that has attracted praise is Brazil’s coastal fisheries, which Begossi (2006) 
describes as  stable, though lack of landings data makes difficult an assessment of its sustainability. In Japan, 
territoriality originated in feudal institutions and gradually evolved from an informal, bottom-up system to a 
formal, state-endorsed system when its TURFs were given legal status in 1901 (Cancino et al 2007). In Chile, a 
formal system of territorial property rights was introduced during the 1990s by a top-down process initiated by 
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the government to deal with the failure of the shellfish fisheries, exhausted by the export boom resulting from 
liberalization (Gelcich et al 2005). There is more central control over TURFs (eg by monitoring) in Chile than in 
Japan, but in both countries management of the TURFs on the ground is carried out by groups of fishers, and in 
both countries, the territorial systems seem to work well (Cancino et al 2007; Gelcich et al 2006). Indeed, in 
Chile, not only did target species improve, but non-target species also thrived (Gelcich et al 2008). In Vietnam, 
a formal community-based territorial system in Vietnam was introduced in 2009 by conscious design to regulate 
the fisheries in the Tam Giang Lagoon, which were in danger of ecological collapse because of over-fishing, 
aquaculture, and near-shore development (Armitage et al 2011). This territorial use rights fisheries (TURF) 
system, which included zoning of the lagoon into different functions and purposes based on local knowledge, 
and the allocation of access rights to self-managing groups, resulted in an increase in overall catch levels and a 
reduction in the number of poor households. Ruddle (1998) also described the TURF system in some coastal 
areas of Vietnam, though he noted that in other areas, territorial rights were over-ridden by the first-comer rule. 
Freire and Garcia-Allut (2000) recommended the introduction of TURFs into the artisanal coastal fisheries in 
Galicia, northwest Spain, to help halt the over-harvesting of many target stocks.            
 
The potential benefits of TURFs, informal and formal, have thus been demonstrated in a variety of fisheries in 
both developing and developed countries. Thirty years ago, Christy (1982) noted that TURFs were attracting 
increasing attention for two reasons – efficiency and equity. On efficiency, White and Costello (2011) claimed 
that territoriality promises to reduce overexploitation, while according to Begossi (2006), territoriality can play a 
crucial part in the conservation of fisheries; and on equity, Christy (1982) claimed that community control of 
TURFs secured the welfare of artisanal fishers, while according to Gelcich et al (2007: 247), “TURFs change 
the nature of resource extraction. Hunting is transformed into harvesting, as a degree of predictability is 
introduced”. Moreover, territoriality helps to reduce conflict over resources (Begossi 2006).   
 
There is prima facie evidence that a system of territoriality exists in the lobster fishery in northeast England 
which is within the jurisdiction of the Northumberland Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority (NIFCA, 
formerly Northumberland Sea Fisheries Committee). This study investigates that evidence to determine whether 
territoriality exists, and if so, whether it plays a significant role in this lobster fishery, and what are its benefits to 
the fishery and the community. The study makes use of two theories of territoriality, economic defendability, 
and community norms, and links them to two forms of territoriality identified by Acheson (2003) – the weak 
form exemplified in ‘nucleated territoriality’ which is rooted in economic defendability; and the strong form 
exemplified in ‘perimeter territoriality’ which is rooted in community norms.  
 
Section 2 describes the study site; section 3 outlines the theoretical framework that informs the paper together 
with the methods used to obtain data; section 4 presents the results of the fieldwork; section 5 discusses these 
results; and section 6 concludes the paper by summarising its findings and wider implications.    
 
2. Northumberland Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority (NIFCA) district 
 
The Northumberland potting fishery is a multi-species fishery targeting predominantly European lobster 
(Homarus gammarus) and brown crab (Cancer pagurus), but also velvet swimming crab (Necora puber) and 
prawns (Nephrops norvegicus). Target species are fished using pots, which are fished in ‘fleets’ of 20-40 per 
‘string’. Pots are baited and deployed, and left to soak for one to two days in summer, and often longer in 
winter, depending on weather conditions. Potting vessels in the district are between 4-12 m in length, with most 
skippers being owners or co-owners of vessels. The majority of vessels work within a 12 nautical mile (nmi) 
limit and employ one or two crew members. There are no legal restrictions on where fishers may fish, though in 
2009, the NIFCA introduced a limit of 800 on the number of pots that any fisher could own for use within its 
area of jurisdiction, which is a 160 km coastal strip from North Shields to the English/Scottish border, out to 6 
nmi (Figure 1).  
 
3. Conceptual clarification, theoretical framework and methodology 
 
3.1 Conceptual clarification 
 
There are a number of definitions of the term ‘territoriality’, most of which emphasise two key characteristics of 
territorial behaviour: exclusivity of use in a fishing area; and active defence of that area (Dyson-Hudson and 
Smith 1978). Defence may be through active means such as damaging the fishing gear of trespassing fishers 
(Acheson 2003) or passive means such as placement of traps to maintain control over space (Blyth et al. 2002), 
or withholding information about where the best fishing spots and/or one’s favourite fishing spots are located 
(Ruddle and Akimichi 1989). As Christy (1982: 4) notes, “A TURF is not so much resource specific as it is site 
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specific”, though White and Costello (2011) maintain that in the case of mobile species, the larger the territorial 
area the better to secure control over the target species within each TURF. Nor does territoriality mean 
ownership of the site, but only its use. According to Christy (1982: 4, 5), there are four sorts of use rights 
necessary for effective territoriality: (1) the right of exclusion - ie the right to control access; (2) the right to use 
– ie the right to do things in the space; (3) the right to benefit from the use – ie the right to take things from the 
site; and (4) the right to future returns from the use – ie the right to security of tenure.  
  
However, identifying whether or not territoriality exists is complicated by variability in the characteristics of 
territories, including the degree to which they are exclusive or overlap; the extent to which they are defended; 
the methods of their defence; their duration (how long they have been in place); their stability (how much they 
can be relied upon); their flexibility (how forgiving they are to rule-breakers) (Dyson-Hudson & Smith 1978); 
and the facts that boundaries may be clearly demarcated or diffuse, and that territories may apply only to 
particular resources, technologies or times (Pollnac 1984). Moreover, as Acheson (2003: 53) points out, 
territoriality is a socially constructed concept (“a contested construction”) in that its meaning is to some extent 
dependent on how people interpret it and what they want it to mean.  
 
3.2 Theoretical framework 
 
There is much debate over the factors that influence the development of informal systems of territoriality, which 
include environmental, ecological, social and political drivers (Pollnac 1984). Two theories are particularly 
useful in clarifying these drivers: economic defendability and community norms. The theory of economic 
defendability is outlined by Dyson-Hudson & Smith (1978) in terms of an economic or cost-benefit model of 
territoriality postulating that where resources are abundant and predictable, then territoriality will be sought, 
because the benefits of excluding other fishers (e.g. enabling higher catch rates to be maintained (Acheson 
1975)) outweigh the costs (e.g. the time, energy and risks involved in defence of an area), whereas if resources 
are scarce or unpredictable, alternative strategies such as fishers adopting greater mobility will be sought. The 
drive towards territoriality is therefore seen as resulting from the rational choice of individuals in weighing up 
the balance of costs and benefits involved in territorial behaviour. On this view, there is nothing innately or 
culturally natural about territoriality – it is a purely cold-blooded, strategic, self-interested calculation by a group 
of individual fishers to devise rules that protect their marine property rights by keeping other fishers out.  
 
The theory of economic defendability is reflected in a weak form of territoriality identified by Acheson (2003) 
as ‘nucleated’ territoriality. In the Maine lobster fishery, nucleated territories are found in mainland areas where 
although there is a core area of strong territoriality near the mouth of a harbour, it becomes progressively weaker 
the farther out to the open sea the fisher goes. The territorial areas are comparatively large; boundaries are less 
precise further from the harbour; there is much ‘mixed’ fishing (i.e., fishing by both members and non-members 
of the harbour gangs) especially far out to sea, because territorial rules are less strictly adhered to, if at all, 
offshore (Acheson and Gardner 2005); the size of the harbour gangs is large; entry into the gangs is relatively 
easy; the gang members do not interact much; they are individualistic and not particularly dependent on each 
other; there is little sense of community between them; they are not completely dependent on the lobster stocks 
for their livelihoods; they have to maintain their fishing rights by continuing to make use of fishing territory; 
and incursions by outsiders do not automatically trigger retaliation – it depends on the seriousness of the 
offence, the support that the incursion can muster, and the strength of opposition that the gang members can 
mobilise.  
  
The second theory of territoriality is community norms, according to which territories are regulated by social 
and cultural norms and rules that guide fishers’ behaviour. Such community norms are easier to achieve in small 
groups where resource users interact frequently and are able to monitor each other, enabling the development of 
mutual trust, which can facilitate collective action (Ostrom et al. 1999; Dietz et al. 2003). On this model, the 
prospects for territoriality are best where there is strong community cohesion and sense of collective identity 
(Levine 1984). There may also be a psychological or genetic element of innate affection for the proximate – a 
sense of belonging to the area immediately surrounding one’s home. In the cofriadas in Catalonia, trawl fishers 
perceived their rights over fishing grounds to be related to the proximity to their home port (Alegret 1998). 
 
The theory of community norms is reflected in a strong form of territoriality that Acheson (2003) terms 
‘perimeter’ territoriality, which is based on social norms and community solidarity. In Maine, perimeter 
territorial areas are found off a few islands and some mainland areas, where perimeter boundaries are very 
precise and defended vigorously. Here the territorial areas are comparatively small; the sense of ownership is 
strong all the way out to the perimeter boundary; there is little or no ‘mixed’ fishing because the territorial rules 
are strictly adhered to; the perimeter fishers know each other well, interacting closely; they depend upon each 
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other; they rely on the lobster stocks for their livelihood; intruders are dealt with quickly, automatically, and 
severely (including cutting pots adrift, damaging boats, and even committing physical violence); the gangs have 
developed rules that confer benefits on the group as a whole; strict rules limit entry to the gangs; the sense of 
ownership of fishing areas is much stronger than in nucleated areas, often linked to land ownership; and a 
powerful sense of ancestral continuity exists, carrying on traditions of parents and grandparents (“longevity 
gives sanctity to norms” (Acheson 2003: 34)). Acheson claims that perimeter territorial areas are more 
successful than are nucleated territorial areas in protecting lobster stocks. For example, in perimeter territorial 
areas there are fewer boats per unit area; higher catch per unit of effort; larger lobsters; a larger breeding stock 
and stock density; and greater revenue.  
 
These two models linked with Acheson’s distinction between nucleated and perimeter territoriality will help us 
clarify the factors determining the existence and form of territoriality in the Northumberland lobster fishery.  
 
3.3 Methodology 
 
3.3.1 Semi-structured interviews with skippers 
Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with fishers to explore factors underpinning their 
decision-making and behaviour (Holland and Sutinen 1999; Anderson and Christensen 2006). Interviews were 
conducted between March and September 2009 with 44 fishers (94% of active fishers) at 6 ports (data for the 
small neighbouring ports of Boulmer and Craster were aggregated because of the few respondents) (Table 1). 
This represents 44% of the 101 vessels actively targeting lobster in the NIFCA district in 2008 (NIFCA, pers. 
comm. 2011). The target population comprised skippers of registered shellfishing vessels who were considered 
by NIFCA to be actively targeting shellfish. Because of the small number of fishers, an attempt was made to 
interview all those identified. Initial contact with fishers was made through NIFCA fishery officers. Subsequent 
interviewees were contacted via snowballing methods (interviewees provided contact details or introductions to 
others (Bunce et al. 2000)), or by approaching fishers on the quayside. Interviews were conducted with vessel 
skippers since they were considered most likely to make decisions concerning where to fish. While the use of 
snowballing methods can lead to bias if individuals provide introductions to respondents similar to themselves 
(Richardson et al. 2005), the small target communities meant it was possible to interview a very high percentage 
of fishers using this method, including individuals with differing views and those with weaker relationships to 
fishery officers. The ports selected were chosen to represent a range of ports within the district, both 
geographically and in terms of size and composition of fishing fleet. Interviews were carried out at times and 
places convenient to fishers and were semi-structured, lasting between 30 minutes and three hours, and most 
were digitally recorded and transcribed. Respondents were asked both open-ended and closed questions 
designed to elicit information on their decision-making, in particular in relation to spatial behaviour. Open-
ended questions on short-term and long-term behaviour (fishing ‘tactics’ and ‘strategies’ respectively) were 
asked to obtain fishers’ views on factors that influence their decisions about where to fish. Interviewees were 
then asked specific questions about formal and informal rules influencing choice of fishing locations; the extent 
to which there was conflict over space in the fishery; and the degree to which fishers were considered to be 
protective of fishery resources. Subsequently, fishers were prompted with 14 factors identified from the 
literature on fishers’ decision-making, and asked to rate their importance in day-to-day decisions about where to 
fish. Each factor was rated on a four-point scale, from ‘not important’ to ‘very important’. Any additional 
factors or explanatory statements were noted.  
 
3.3.2 Unstructured interviews with key informants 
Five (?) unstructured (?) interviews were carried out with key informants who were officials in either NIFCA or 
the UK Marine Fisheries Agency (MFA).   
 
3.3.3 Observations of fishing activity 
Maps of the home range of fishing activity from each port were estimated using kernel density analysis in 
Hawth’s Tools (Beyer 2004), based on sightings of fishing vessels recorded by NIFCA from 2004-2008  
 
3.3.4 Data analysis 
Qualitative data from the semi-structured interviews were analysed using NVivo V.7 (QSR 2006). Statements 
were coded according to themes derived from relevant literature (Table 2), in particular from a model proposed 
for the analysis of TURFS (Pollnac 1984). The first codes related to whether or not respondents felt that there 
was territoriality among fishing vessels or ports, and corresponded to characteristics of territoriality. 
Subsequently, responses were coded to identify factors driving change in territorial behaviour, or explaining 
differences in the degree of territoriality among ports.  
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4. Results 
 
4.1 Evidence of the existence of territoriality 
 
The observation mapping of the home ranges of fishing activity revealed the area in which 95% of the fishing 
activity from each port is expected to occur based on the sample of observed activity. While no fishers claimed 
to maintain exclusive access over fishing grounds, many fishers indicated that both now and in the past, 
particular fishing grounds were associated with different fishing ports. Within ports, competition for space was 
seen predominantly to be a scramble for the best fishing spots rather than continued use of a particular area by 
any individual. Based on their knowledge and experience, individual fishers allocate their fishing effort across a 
number of fishing areas, some of which may be commonly known, while others may be considered secret. The 
home ranges of lobster fishing fleets from the ports studied ranged from 76-260 km
2
, of which between 19% to 
69% was used exclusively by vessels from one port (Table 1). Maps of observed fishing activity suggested that 
no port maintained exclusive use of the whole of the mapped home range (Fig. 1). Areas of exclusive use tended 
to be close to vessels’ home ports, with greater overlap north and south towards the edges of home ranges and 
closer to adjacent ports.  
 
Port Active fishing vessels 
(number interviewed) 
Home range 2004-2008,  
km
2
 
Area of exclusive HR 
use, km
2
 (% of HR) 
Amble 17 (16) 260 163 (63) 
Blyth 11 (10) 188 88 (47) 
Boulmer & Craster 4 (3) 188 35 (19) 
Seahouses 9 (9) 76 47 (62) 
Holy Island 6 (6) 257 178 (69) 
 
Table 1 The home ranges of fishing activity in the NIFCA district  
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Figure 1. Overlap of port home ranges within the NIFCA district in a) Blyth, b) Amble, c) Boulmer and Craster, 
d) Seahouses and e) Holy Island 
 
The interview data also revealed considerable evidence of territorial behaviour. For example, fishers reported 
boundary conflicts between ports, particularly as a result of boats travelling further afield than in the past. The 
main locus of conflict was in the vicinity of the ports of Boulmer and Craster, where vessels from Amble had 
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increasingly been fishing. Fishers in Boulmer and Craster stated that they had remained in the same grounds 
they had historically fished, while adjacent ports had expanded their activities. All respondents in these ports 
acknowledged conflict over space between themselves and vessels from Amble, describing strategic placement 
of fishing gear to limit access to outsiders, and recalling  incidents in which Amble vessels fishing further north 
than usual had experienced damage to their gear. Likewise, all interviewees in Amble mentioned conflict with 
vessels from Craster and Boulmer to the north, and to a lesser extent with vessels from Newbiggin to the south. 
Fishers from these ports were characterised by Amble skippers as very territorial. Several fishers described 
conflict with boats from these ports, from oral exchanges at sea to gear damage while fishing in the vicinity of 
the ports. Amble vessels considered such actions as a warning that they were “treading on the toes” of boats 
from those ports. One Amble fisher commented: “if they see an Amble bow they just go and cut it off or damage 
it, they think you shouldn’t be there. Boats that go up there get a lot of hassle; they must think the sea there is 
theirs”. Several key informants confirmed the strength of territoriality in the north of the district, especially 
around Boulmer: “they won’t let anyone else there. They just turn around and say ‘you’re not allowed here’ – 
they would cut their boats free, move their pots…people have been threatened. One of the Boulmer guys shot 
one of the Amble guy’s big dahns, so the police ended up getting involved. They’re very territorial…They 
believe from where they look out that is their sea and nobody else is allowed in that area…it’s their god-given 
right…and they’re very strong on it”. Some fishermen spoke of the danger of retaliating and cutting others’ 
gear, acknowledging that it was often difficult to be certain of who was responsible, and that retaliation could 
escalate to conflict in which they might lose a lot of fishing gear. Other Amble fishers noted that the areas of 
potential conflict could change – one respondent pointing out: “There are boundaries but they aren’t strict, they 
change from year to year…they [vary] about a mile or two depending on what other people are doing. If they’re 
fishing further north and doing well they couldn’t give a monkeys if you come up a bit further north”.  
 
The basis of this territorial behaviour was partly economic defendability, and partly community norms. 
Economic defendability was evident particularly where there was abundance of stock. Fishers recognised the 
advantages of deterring other vessels in areas of productive fishing grounds, both in terms of the short-term 
benefits of reduced competition for the same target species, and potential long-term benefits through being able 
to ‘look after’ areas of ground. For example, fishers suggested that greater availability and quality of potting 
ground in the vicinity of Boulmer and Craster made it economically worthwhile to defend those fishing grounds. 
A number of fishers indicated that frustration and expense associated with frequent gear damage outweighed 
potential benefits and dissuaded them from fishing in that area. One Amble fisher commented: “you seem to get 
your gear sabotaged. Once that happened a few times I moved back down this way - it’s further to travel up 
there…you find your markers cut off and gear piled in a heap. By the time you get there and clear that heap up 
and re-bait your pots you're working against the tide, it just wasn’t adding up”.  
 
Community norms were evident in three motivating factors: environmental stewardship; tradition; and 
gentlemen’s agreements. First, some fishers felt strongly that environmental stewardship of fishing grounds 
depended on the exclusion of outsiders, because boats coming into the area may not comply with stock 
conservation measures such as the ban on landing undersized and V-notched lobsters. One Blyth fisher 
commented: “If you’ve got an area you’ve fished and looked after for a number of years...then someone turns 
up and seems a bit shady…then there might be some element of discouragement…I think without that sort of 
attitude, people looking after their patch, then the fishery could get destroyed”.  
 
Second, some fishers stated that people had specific areas they had always fished, with older fishers 
commenting that ‘traditional’ fishers from all ports would stick to their own fishing grounds. For example, an 
older fisher in Blyth stated: “We work the same ground we've worked for years. I would never dream of trying 
to take anybody else’s stuff. Although it doesn’t belong to them, it’s off their place and I wouldn’t go there. We 
were brought up that way but maybe it’s old fashioned”. Seven fishers (five from the smaller, more rural ports 
of Boulmer, Craster, and Holy Island) claimed that only local or traditional fishermen (those who had descended 
from fishing families and been brought up in the area) should have a right to access the resource (Table 3). A 
key informant said that “The further north you get, they don’t like outsiders and won’t accept it. Legally, it’s not 
right, but that’s the way they are, it’s their community, it’s a very strong community”. Fishers also discussed 
discouraging outsiders through social sanctions, one Holy Island fisher commenting: “If someone came up from 
Newcastle with a boat he would be shunned by the rest of the fishermen and wouldn’t last 5 minutes”. A key 
informant reported that “There was a guy tried to start fishing on Holy island – they slashed his tyres on his car, 
sabotaged his boat and gear, and he left in the end – someone from down south who’d moved up here”.  
 
Third, several fishers mentioned that in the past, ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ dictated that boats from each port 
tended to stay within particular fishing grounds, maintaining boundaries either by mutual cooperation or active 
defence of fishing areas. For example, a Holy Island fisher stated: “You used to be a stone’s throw away from 
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the Seahouses boats but you knew not to go in amongst their gear - it was just a gentlemen’s agreement, I don’t 
think anything would happen if you did but it would cause bad feeling”. A key informant noted that this 
sentiment was stronger in the north of the district: “each community or port has their own area, a lot of it is a 
gentleman’s agreement – we won’t encroach on your area if you don’t encroach on ours. However, more so up 
the coast they tend to honour it, southern end it doesn’t work anymore now, there’s no gentleman’s agreement, 
no nothing…they’ll put them anywhere, not bothered what people think…with a lot of them, it’s dog eat dog”. 
Although fishers pointed out that vessels were increasingly travelling further from their home port and “pushing 
the boundaries”, it was acknowledged that there were still boundaries that influenced spatial behaviour. One 
Blyth fisher commented: “[Conflict] doesn’t happen very often because people keep within their own areas, an 
unwritten gentlemen’s agreement if you like. It’s part of the reason why people don’t move too far - you've got 
to think about fuel and time to get your gear and stuff like that, but that’s part of it as well”.  
 
However, the data also showed several factors motivating spatial behaviour that were independent of 
territoriality. The mostly commonly prioritised factors, considered very important by 80% of fishers, were wind 
and weather (grouped as one factor). If strong winds were forecast, fishers tended to move their pots to deeper 
water to prevent damage to gear in rough seas. Weather conditions were also said to affect lobster catchability, 
with four fishers mentioning that they expected better catches when there was a slight swell, as lobsters would 
be more active than in calm water. Seasonality was perceived to be important or very important by 86% of 
fishers, due to changing weather conditions and seasonal biological cycles or movements of target species. Full-
time fishers tended to move fishing gear closer inshore in summer to target lobster (Homarus gammarus) and 
velvet crab (Necora puber), and further offshore in winter to target large lobsters (Homarus gammarus) and 
brown crab (Cancer pagurus). Moreover, even as seasonal considerations are becoming less significant with the 
increasing trend towards all-year-round lobster potting there had been no increase in territoriality.  
 
For most fishers, personal experience, independent of territorial considerations, counted for much in influencing 
their fishing location decisions. Short-term and long-term experience in the fishery was perceived to be 
important by 95% and 91% of fishers respectively. Short-term experience (information from recent fishing trips 
or recent experiences of different fishing grounds) often led to pots being deployed in the same location if 
catches were good in the previous haul. Several fishers kept logbooks and considered long-term experience, 
built up throughout their career, to be vital in developing knowledge of which areas were productive at 
particular times of year or under certain weather conditions. Market conditions were perceived to be important 
or very important by 34% when deciding where to fish: eight fishers commenting that there were productive 
lobster fishing areas that they tried to leave alone during the peak lobster season when prices were lowest, or 
that when prices were high they might take more of a risk in choosing where to fish. Also, 48% of respondents 
said that the cost of fuel was an important factor in determining where they fished, particularly by fishers 
tending to travel further, who said that they considered fishing closer to home if catches were poor or if fuel 
prices were particularly high.  
 
Vessel capability was another factor influencing fishing locations. In some cases, vessel capability (including 
vessel speed, size and hauling and navigational equipment aboard) limited mobility for safety reasons, with 
smaller vessels being more confined to inshore fishing grounds, while larger vessels had greater freedom to 
explore areas further afield. As technology had improved, even the smaller vessels had gained more freedom, 
enabling fishers to travel greater distances from their home port. The development of geographic positioning 
systems (GPS), navigational equipment and ground discrimination systems were considered by some fishers to 
have made local knowledge less integral to successful fishing, and to have enabled outsiders to enter the fishery. 
A Seahouses skipper explained: “When I started at sea I had to learn the landmarks from my father and uncles, 
and you didn’t get strangers coming because they didn’t have the local knowledge, but with the advancement of 
satnav [satellite navigation equipment] and everything, anyone could come into your area”. 
 
Congestion also influenced fisher’s behaviour, encouraging the non-territorial principle of ‘first come first 
served’: competition was described as a scramble among fishers to position themselves on the best fishing 
grounds during periods of high congestion, rather than an attempt to maintain exclusive use to an area, though 
the ‘first-come-first-served’ principle mainly operated between fishers within the same community territory, 
rather than fishers crossing community borders. Congestion was considered important or very important by 77% 
of fishers in their decision-making: most preferred to try and find ‘fresh ground’ to place gear on, though fifteen 
fishers commented that this had become increasingly difficult because of the greater numbers of pots being 
worked. Fishers at all ports described severe competition for space in productive inshore areas at the height of 
the lobster season (July-October), and reported that the number of pots used had increased in recent years. One 
Seahouses fisher commented :“In the 80s and 90s boats only had one set of gear…the trend has been to 
increase gear and work 2 or 3 sets…It’s not necessarily a good thing as it takes up lots of ground…but everyone 
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has done it virtually so you have to go with the flow”. One reason for increased congestion was a shift of fishers 
from trawling into potting, with two thirds of respondents having previously been or being currently engaged in 
trawling. Some fishers suggested that those who had moved from trawling to potting tended to be those who 
fished further from home and had little territorial commitment.  
 
4.2 Evidence of the importance of territoriality 
 
If we look at the rank ordering by most fishers of the factors influencing their choice of location to fish (see 
Figure 2), at first sight we might conclude that territoriality is very low on their priority list.  The most important 
factors influencing decisions on where to fish were perceived to be wind/weather; short/long-term experience; 
seasons; congestion; and vessel capability/fuel costs – all of which are non-territorial factors. By contrast, the 
least important factors include tradition, which is a prime territorial factor. However, since Figure 2 does not 
cover other territorial factors such as abundance of stock, environmental stewardship, and informal agreements, 
the predominance of non-territorial factors could be exaggerated. Nevertheless, most fishers held that no one 
possesses a territorial right to areas in the sea and stated that either nobody, or everybody, owned the sea and 
fishery resources (Table 3). For example, an Amble fisher said of salmon netters who seasonally switch to 
potting: “Now they can’t really see their salmon season through because they think if they don’t get their pots 
in, the Amble men will catch all the lobsters, so I can see why they get upset, but the sea doesn’t belong to 
anyone, you can’t stop anyone from going up there”.  
 
The majority of respondents (n=25, 57%) thought that anyone had a right to access the sea and fishery resources 
provided they held a licence and conformed to its conditions. In other words, for them, the social norm of ‘first 
come first served’ was prior to the social norm of territoriality. The majority (55%) of respondents did not 
perceive there to be any informal rules or agreements regarding allocation of fishing grounds among vessels 
within or between home ports, although several fishers gave ambiguous answers to the question of whether 
informal rules had existed in the past, or still did exist in other ports, while some suggested that newcomers were 
still forced to fish more marginal areas. 
 
The data also reveals that the power of territoriality was waning, for four reasons. First, the strength of the 
potters’ conservation ethic appeared to have weakened in recent years, according to fishers from Boulmer and 
Craster, one of whom recalled: “Years ago when I was young there was one year they all agreed to leave the 
lobsters until the middle of September while the lobsters were in poor condition. They asked places either side 
to respect it… Now though if you didn’t put your pots in when everyone else does you might as well not bother, 
within a fortnight there's nothing left”. 
 
Second, fishers said that tradition had become less important among younger generations, since younger fishers 
and new entrants to the fishery were motivated by greed and did not respect traditions. A young Seahouses 
interviewee explained: “Older fishermen that have been fishing there all their life, they maybe think they have a 
right over me but at the end of the day their shellfish licence is the same as mine”.  
 
Third was the increasing weight of legal sanctions against criminal behaviour in defence of fishing territory. 
Several fishers from Amble suggested that the defence of territorial areas had declined in recent years due to the 
growing likelihood that interfering with another’s fishing gear would be treated as a crime. An Amble fisher 
commented: “You know you’re breaking the law if you do that kind of thing now, but in the past interfering with 
someone’s fishing gear wasn’t seen as a crime, people would have done it blatantly. Now it’s a lot less 
vehement, more restrained – not that anyone is any more flexible than they were, but there’s more chance of 
[officials] getting involved – the repercussions are far greater now”.  
  
Fourth, there had been a decline in community cohesion, thereby weakening the capacity for collective action to 
defend territory. In Amble and Blyth, a considerable degree of social stratification and division occurred in the 
fishing industry as many newcomers, seasonal and part-time, joined, often from surrounding areas with little or 
no fisheries background, which had led to a greater tendency for people to be self-interested. Fishers in Boulmer 
and Craster depicted Amble fishers as “lawless” and motivated by greed, one of them stating: “[The 
trawlermen] are really the biggest problem, they're the worst offenders because it’s big boat mentality, catch as 
much as possible as quick as possible, and they've forced us into doing the same, otherwise it’d just be a waste 
of time. Once you get south of Boulmer you notice a difference in the people”. For their part, Amble fishers 
described Boulmer and Craster as small, traditional, clannish, old-fashioned communities that were “still in the 
dark ages”. In fact, fishers from the more rural ports of Boulmer, Craster, Seahouses and Holy Island suggested 
that their communities were also less closely-knit than in the past as a result of increasing numbers of tourists 
and holiday homes, and fishing families “dying out”. 
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4.3 Evidence of the value of territoriality 
What evidence is there that the territoriality that does remain in the Northumberland lobster fishery has a 
beneficial effect? According to Acheson (2003), territoriality in the Maine lobster fishery has benefitted both the 
stocks and the livelihoods of fishers. In Northumberland, although the data is patchy, lobster stocks are 
reasonably healthy, and the number of lobster fishers remains steady [add figures?]. How far this moderately 
successful state of affairs is attributable to informal territoriality rather than to formal management measures 
(such as pot limits, minimum landing sizes, berried hen regulations, licence restrictions, and gear rules), is a 
moot point, but fishers themselves believe that territoriality has helped [add data?]    
 
5. Discussion 
 
While there is some territoriality in fishers’ choice of fishing locations in the Northumberland lobster fishery, 
there are several drivers of fishers’ behaviour that are independent of territoriality, and the power of territoriality 
is diminishing. Intergenerational differences, increased weight of legal sanctions, technological developments, 
and erosion of community cohesion may have contributed to the decline in the normative influence on fishers’ 
behaviour, particularly in the larger, more urbanised ports. Moreover, the rationale for older fishers staying 
within ‘traditional’ grounds close to their home port (Cabrera & Defeo 2001) may be a result, less of 
territoriality than of unfamiliarity with other areas and minimising risk-taking or uncertainty (Holland & Sutinen 
1999; Hutton et al. 2004). The basis of the remaining territoriality is primarily in community norms rather than 
economic defendability, and its future survival depends on how long the social norms of environmental 
stewardship, tradition, and gentlemen’s agreements can hold out against the tide of technical development, 
market globalisation, and community disintegration.  
 
These findings correspond to studies of the lobster fishery in Maine, where strongly defended areas (perimeter 
territoriality) driven by community norms are more persistent, while more weakly defended areas (nucleated 
territoriality) influenced more by economic defendability are less persistent – partly because law enforcement 
has tightened; and second, because technological improvements in vessel design have made it possible for 
fishers to catch lobsters in offshore areas where there is no territoriality. So although Acheson (2003) maintains 
that there still exists a residual element of territoriality in the Maine lobster fishery, especially in perimeter 
areas, the extent of those perimeter territorial areas had shrunk and some fishers considered them to be in 
terminal decline. 
 
The informal rule of territoriality may be replaced in the future by another informal rule – that of usufruct (i.e., 
use of the resources of the area on a ‘first-come-first-served’ basis, not only between fishers within a particular 
community, but also between fishers from different communities. There is some evidence that the social norm 
of ‘first-come-first-served’ is already replacing territoriality in the Northumberland lobster fishery as the means 
of determining who fishes where. However, if the principle of territoriality is judged to be too valuable to lose, 
NIFCA may have to reinforce its informal basis by a formal, legal foundation, and it could do this by making 
use of its new powers under section 6.4 of the IFCA Guidelines (Defra 2011): to “prohibit or restrict the 
exploitation of sea fisheries resources in specified areas or periods or limiting the amount of resources that may 
be exploited or the amount of time a person or vessel may spend exploiting fisheries resources in a specified 
period”. This is broadly what is happening in the Maine lobster fishery where, as the power of informal 
territoriality wanes (“the local-scale informal system…may well be on its way to extinction” (Acheson and 
Gardner 2005: 311)), people are looking to the law to regulate access to the lobster fishery (Acheson 2003). 
Perhaps this shows that informal territoriality is inherently fragile and vulnerable, and that formal territoriality is 
the only permanent solution, as Christy (1982: 6) implies: “In situations where territorial rights have been 
acquired, there is a tendency for them to break down if there is no strong legal and institutional protection of the 
rights”.     
 
6. Conclusion 
 
There are some drivers of fishing behaviour in the Northumberland lobster fishery that maintain a sense of 
territoriality in some areas despite powerful pressures that serve to dilute it. Although weaker than in the past, 
the sense of territoriality is still perceived by some fishers to play a valuable role in maintaining the stability and 
sustainability of the fishery. Of the two main theories that explain the persistence of territoriality – economic 
defendability and community norms – the latter is more applicable to the Northumberland lobster fishery. 
However, the social norm of usufruct on a ‘first-come-first-served’ basis is beginning to replace the principle of 
territoriality as the means of resolving inter-community, as well as intra-community, spatial conflict, so if the 
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benefits of the informal principle of territoriality are to be safeguarded, it will have to be reinforced by legal 
endorsement.  
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